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I. INTRODUCTION
Janice had enjoyed working for her employer for the past twenty
years, but during this past year, her work environment changed when
a new supervisor was hired. In just a few short months, her employ-
ment became intolerable: her male supervisor made daily advances
toward her, cornered her when she was alone, and threatened her
with the loss of her job. Janice filed a complaint with the personnel
office, but because no one could corroborate her story, the investiga-
tion ended, and Janice was discharged by her supervisor.
Janice filed a claim against the company alleging sexual harass-
ment and retaliatory discharge. The company, in defending the suit,
engaged in its own informal discovery. In combing through old fies,
the personnel director checked Janice's employment application, and
discovered that five years before applying for a job at the company,
Janice had been convicted of possessing illegal narcotics when she was
nineteen years old. Janice did not include this conviction on her em-
ployment application though it specifically requested such informa-
tion. The company stated that this omission, constituting after-
acquired evidence, should allow the company an order of summary
judgment against Janice's claims, because if the company knew of this
conviction at the time, Janice would never have been hired. Up until
this year, the employer in this case would have had a legal basis in the
Fifth,1 Sixth,2 Seventh,3 Eighth,4 and Tenth5 Circuits. However, on
1. Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd, 35 F.3d 561
(5th Cir. 1994).
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January 23, 1995, the United States Supreme Court decided McKen-
non v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,6 which should eliminate sum-
mary judgment for employers asserting the defense of after-acquired
evidence to defend discrimination cases.7
After-acquired evidence refers not only to evidence of an em-
ployee's fraud or misrepresentation on a r~sum6 or employment appli-
cation but also to an employee's on-the-job misconduct 8 which is
discovered after the employee brings a complaint for unlawful
discrimination.
This year, the Supreme Court was presented for the first time with
the issue of whether after-acquired evidence of an employee's miscon-
2. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
3. Washington v. Lake County, 11l., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
4. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994).
5. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
6. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), rev'g, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993).
7. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in McKennon, the Third,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had already limited the scope of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine by allowing the employee some recovery. See Mardell v. Har-
leysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted and vacated, 115
S. Ct. 1397 (1995), and aff'd inpart and remanded inpart, No. 93-3258, 1995 WL
429103 (3d Cir. Jul. 20, 1995); E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir.
1994); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacatedpend-
ing reh'g en bane, 32 F.3d 1489 (1994), and on reh'g en banc, 62 F.3d 374 (1995);
infra text accompanying notes 10-36.
See also Jimenez-Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987)(although not specifically addressing the after-
acquired evidence doctrine, the court stated that after-acquired evidence in case
was only relevant to future demotions); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728
F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984)(stating that recreating
the circumstances that would have existed but for the illegal discrimination can
be established by after-acquired evidence provided such evidence is proved at
trial on remedy issue); Proulx v. Citibank, 681 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
aff'd, 862 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1988)(not specifically addressing the after-acquired
evidence doctrine but refusing to deny damages based upon speculation).
Other circuit court decisions have now been rendered since McKennon was
issued. See, e.g., Russell v. Microdyne Corp., No. 93-1895, 1995 WL 570413 (4th
Cir. Sept. 28, 1995); Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106 (5th Cir.
1995); Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 49 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1995);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 52 F.3d 294 (10th Cir. 1995); Ricky v. Mapco, Inc., 50
F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1995); Manard v. Fort Howard Corp., 47 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir.
1995).
8. For misconduct cases, see, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct.
879 (1995)(employee copied confidential papers and took them home); Summers
v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988)(employee
falsified company records during course of his employment); Malone v. Signal
Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 370 (D. Colo. 1993)(remanding case to
see whether employee engaged in sexual harassment and misconduct while on
job); Schuessler v. Benchmark Mktg. and Consulting, Inc., 243 Neb. 425, 500
N.W.2d 529 (Neb. 1993)(remanding case to determine if employee committed sex-
ual harassment while on job).
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duct should bar all recovery for an employee who has been discrimina-
torily discharged. Only eight short months before, the Eighth Circuit
had answered this same question in the affirmative in Welch v. Liberty
Machine Works, Inc.9 The Supreme Court, however, has chosen the
better route in refusing to deny an employee all relief following a dis-
criminatory discharge. Unfortunately, though, the Supreme Court's
curt opinion does not tie in the finer sub-issues of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine which may leave employers with loopholes and
lower courts with litigation.
This Note will discuss how the recent McKennon decision will af-
fect both employers and employees. First, a brief overview will be pro-
vided explaining the legal status of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine in the circuit courts as it existed immediately prior to the
decision in McKennon. Second, the facts and the holding of the Mc-
Kennon decision will be discussed. Third, an examination will be un-
dertaken as to why the Court and supporting authorities determined
that after-acquired evidence should be irrelevant in determining the
employer's liability. Fourth, a showing will be made that though af-
ter-acquired evidence should perhaps limit a plaintiff's equitable rem-
edies in appropriate cases, it should be irrelevant in determining legal
remedies. Included therein will be a proposal for a more equitable cal-
culation for backpay than the Court in McKennon provided. In conclu-
sion, this Note seeks to extend the positive steps offered in McKennon
by offering a proposal to balance the competing goals of 1) providing a
workplace free of discrimination and harassment, which will 2) en-
courage employees to be honest both when filling out employment ap-
plications and after they are hired and working for the employer.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the recent McKennon decision, proponents of the after-ac-
quired evidence doctrine purported that it would not be fair to allow a
"mischievous" employee to recover against an employer even though
the employer itself may have acted in a discriminatory or harassing
way. Instead of addressing the consequences of discrimination and
harassment in the workplace and fashioning solutions to remedy
these employment problems, a number of courts had simply foreclosed
9. 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994). The court held that after-acquired evidence of em-
ployee misrepresentation will bar recovery for an unlawful discharge, if the em-
ployer establishes that it would not have hired the employee had it known of the
misrepresentation. Id. However, the court confined its holding to determining
what effect r~sum6 fraud has on an employee's claim of discrimination. The court
declined to discuss how on-the-job misconduct by an employee would affect his or
her same claim of discrimination. See id.
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that possibility by awarding the employer a summary judgment
victory.10
A. Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
and Progeny
In the seminal case of Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,11 an employee brought suit against his employer alleg-
ing that he was terminated because of age and religious discrimina-
tion. Defendant State Farm stated that Summers was discharged
because of his falsifications of company records, untimely and poor
quality of reporting, problems with settlement negotiations and cus-
tomer relations, and his generally poor attitude. In preparing for
trial, State Farm discovered 150 additional falsifications Summers
had made on insurance claims while employed. Since the additional
falsifications were not found until four years after Summers' dis-
charge, Summers argued that the falsifications were irrelevant and
inadmissible. However, State Farm purported that although the addi-
tional falsifications could not have been a "cause" for the discharge,
they should still be considered. 12
The Tenth Circuit determined that, because the after-acquired evi-
dence constituted a legitimate reason to fire the employee, the plaintiff
had not sustained an injury and no relief was warranted.13 The court
relied on a number of cases including Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,14 where the Supreme Court held that if a
plaintiff proves the unlawful discharge (in that case a violation of
First Amendment rights) was a substantial factor in the defendant's
decision not to rehire, then the employer could avoid liability only if it
10. See, e.g., Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Va. 1993), rev'd, No.
93-1895, 93-2078, 1995 WL 570413 (4th Cir. Sept. 28, 1995)(lower court holding
that no distinction exists between liability of employer and remedy to employee
when no relief is available because of after-acquired evidence of deception during
hiring). See generally Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th
Cir. 1992); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Sum-
mers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); Baab v.
AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Rich v. Westland Print-
ers, Inc., No. CIV. A. HAR 92-2475, 1993 WL 220453 (D. Md. June 9, 1993); Ben-
son v. Quanex Corp., No. 90-CV-71996-DT, 1992 WL 63013 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24,
1992); Kravit v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. CV-92-0038, 1992 WL 390236 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 4, 1992); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D.
Ariz. 1992); Churchman v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991);
Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., No. 89C3761, 1991 WL 1707 (N.D. IMl. Jan. 9, 1991);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990), rev'd, 52 F.3d 294
(10th Cir. 1995); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D.
Kan. 1989).
11. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
12. Id. at 702-03.
13. Id. at 708.
14. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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proved it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of
the protected conduct.15 Further, the Summers court stated that
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc. 16 instructed district courts that
they should proceed to make the "after-the-fact" rationale. The Sum-
mers court found State Farm's argument valid and held that "while
such after-acquired evidence cannot be said to have been a 'cause' for
Summers' discharge... it is relevant to Summers' claim of 'injury,'
and does itself preclude the grant of any present relief or remedy to
Summers."17 Stating that Summers' argument was "unrealistic," the
Tenth Circuit used the following analogy: a company doctor is fired
"because of his age, race, religion, and sex, and the company, in de-
fending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the discharged
employee was not a 'doctor.'"-8 The masquerading doctor would not
be entitled to relief, and Summers was found to be in no better of a
position.
The Summers decision was followed by a number of courts includ-
ing the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. In Johnson v. Honeywell
Information Systems, Inc. ,19 the forerunner for McKennon, the Sixth
Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit's approach and discussed a fraud
analysis in its case of application misrepresentation, as opposed to on-
the-job misconduct. The court held that the employer would be enti-
tled to summary judgment when the "misrepresentation or omission
was material, directly related to measuring a candidate for employ-
ment, and was relied upon by the employer making the hiring
decision;"20 the materiality of the employee's educational misrepre-
sentation was substantiated, though, simply because company offi-
cials stated that they had relied on this assertion. This line of
reasoning has also been applied to cases of sexual harassment as a
derivative claim of sexual discrimination.21
15. Id. at 287.
16. 728 F.2d 614, 623 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
17. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
18. Id.
19. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
20. Id. at 414. The court found that petitioner's misrepresentation of her education
was a material misrepresentation upon which the company relied, and that this
reliance had been established as a matter of law. Id. The petitioner had worked
as a field relations manager for eight years without the company suspecting she
did not have a college degree. Id. at 411.
21. See, e.g., Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ohio 1993)(stating
that since appellant admitted that he deliberately falsified his employment appli-
cation, it would be impossible for him to show that his discharge was a mere
pretext and that the real reason for the discharge was intentional discrimination
on an unlawful basis); Rich v. Westland Printers, Inc., No. CIV. A. HAR92-2475,
1993 WL 220453 (D. Md. June 9, 1993)(stating that summary judgment is
granted when after-acquired evidence of fraud nullifies any remedies, thereby
rendering any determination of liability moot); Churchman v. Pinkertn's, Inc.,
756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991)(granting summary judgment to the employer
1995] 379
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The Seventh Circuit added another slight twist to the r6sum6
fraud analysis and held that "the appropriate issue in an employment
discrimination case where the plaintiff lied on his application and was
later fired for an unrelated reason is whether the employer, acting in a
race-neutral fashion, would have fired the employee upon discovery of
the misrepresentation, not whether the employer would have hired
the employee had it known the truth."22 Thus, making a distinction
between a standard that focused on "would have fired" and one that
centered on "would not have hired," the court chose the former.
The Eighth Circuit continued the Summers rationale. The court
held that in the application fraud context, as opposed to on-the-job
misconduct,23 the after-acquired evidence of employee misrepresenta-
tion bars recovery for an unlawful discharge if the employer estab-
lishes that it would not have hired the employee had it known of the
misrepresentation. 24 In Welch, the employee had omitted on his job
application that he had been fired from his previous employer for un-
satisfactory performance.
Primarily relying on the Summers case, the court noted that
"[sleveral other circuits have followed Summers and adopted the rule
that after-acquired evidence of an employee's misrepresentation bars
recovery for a discriminatory discharge when the employer would not
have hired, or would have fired, the employee had it known of the mis-
conduct."25 From this line of reasoning, the Eighth Circuit stated that
"[w]e do not believe that an employee should.benefit from his or her
misrepresentation."26 While acknowledging that "[pirimary to the
Wallace27 court was the concern that the Summers rule created a per-
verse incentive contrary to the purposes of Title VII,"28 the Eighth
and stating that the importance of any previous terminations for cause and prior
drug use in an employer's hiring decision cannot be underestimated); Mathis v.
Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989)(holding that sum-
mary judgment is appropriate where the material omissions are directly related
to measuring a candidate for employment and were relied upon in the hiring
decision).
22. Washington v. Lake County, 11l., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992). The court
found no genuine issue of material fact since plaintiff would have been fired if the
employer "had discovered the concealment of his convictions and then treated
him in a race-neutral manner." Id.
23. See supra note 8.
24. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1405 (8th Cir. 1994).
25. Id. at 1405.
26. Id.
27. The Eighth Circuit is referring to the 1992 opinion of Wallace v. Dunn Constr.
Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992)(footnote added). See infra notes 30-36 and
accompanying text.
28. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1405 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Circuit still stated that "[we find that the Summers rule is the better
rule."2
9
B. Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.
The doctrine of after-acquired evidence had gained wide accept-
ance among the courts prior to Summers and indeed afterward.30
However, in 1992, the Eleventh Circuit was the first court to take a
strong stance against the Summers line of cases in Wallace v. Dunn
Construction Co.31 In Wallace, the plaintiff alleged a number of
claims against her former employer, including a hostile work environ-
ment, sexual harassment claim and a retaliatory discharge claim
under Title VII alleging that her numerous objections to sexual har-
assment caused her termination. During discovery, Dunn Construc-
tion became aware that the plaintiff had lied on her employment
application when she stated she had never been convicted of a crime,
when in fact she had pled guilty to drug possession charges.
Stating that the Summers rule ignored the time lapse between the
unlawful act (such as discrimination) and the discovery of a legitimate
motive,32 the court stated that the Summers rule is "antithetical to
the principal purpose of Title VII--'to achieve equality of employment
opportunity' by giving employers incentives 'to self-examine and self-
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate...
employment discrimination.'- 3 3 The court stated that the after-ac-
quired evidence is relevant to the relief sought by a successful Title
VII plaintiff, but the court required the drawing of a boundary be-
29. Id. The court in Welch, though, did not grant summary judgment to the employer
since the only evidence presented to establish that Welch would have been fired
was an affidavit by the company president stating such; no other evidence of the
company's policies were offered. The court noted that "in the after-acquired evi-
dence context, the employer knows only the presumed illegal ground for the dis-
charge," id., and the "employer bears a substantial burden of establishing that
the policy pre-dated the hiring and firing of the employee in question...." Id. at
1406. Since the employer produced a single self-serving affidavit, it did not estab-
lish that it had a settled policy of never hiring individuals such as Welch. Despite
this decision, the court also noted that "[wie do not decide whether an undisputed
employer affidavit could, in some circumstances, establish the requisite material
fact of a particular employer's policy. Rather, we find merely that in this case,
Maier's [the company president] affidavit was not sufficient." Id.
30. See supra note 10.
31. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated pending reh'g en banc, 32 F.3d 1489
(1994), and on reh'g en banc, 62 F.3d 374 (1995).
32. The Wallace court correctly made a distinction between the mixed motive analy-
sis where an employee is discharged for both a lawful and an unlawful motive, see
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), infra note 73, and the after-
acquired evidence analysis where the employee is discharged for an unlawful mo-
tive with the lawful motive found later. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d
1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
33. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 1992).
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tween the preservation of the employer's lawful interest and the resto-
ration of the discrimination victim by making the employee whole for
injuries suffered from the unlawful employment discrimination.34
The Eleventh Circuit holding of Wallace was vacated pending a re-
hearing en banc,35 and the case has since been remanded to comply
with McKennon.36 References, however, are included herein to the
Eleventh Circuit's 1992 Wallace opinion because Wallace was the pri-
mary opinion to reject Summers and a number of courts followed that
lead.37
C. Facts and Holding of McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co.
After thirty years of employment with Nashville Banner Publish-
ing Company ("the Banner"), Christine McKennon lost her job-:-alleg-
edly due to a work force reduction plan. At age sixty-two McKennon
thought the real reason for her discharge was her age, and she
brought suit against the company under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).38 During discovery, the Banner took Mc-
Kennon's deposition. McKennon testified she had copied some of the
company's financial documents during her last year of employment for
her own personal "insurance" and "protection" against a possible dis-
charge due to her age.39 Stating that McKennon would have been
fired had it known of this misconduct, the Banner sought summary
judgment on the basis of this after-acquired evidence. The district
34. Id. at 1181. The court denied summary judgment to the employer on plaintiff's
remedies of backpay, lost wages, and liquidated damages; however, summary
judgment was granted as to reinstatement, front pay, and injunctive relief. Id.
35. In September of 1994, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its opinion handed down two
years earlier and granted a rehearing en banc. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 32
F.3d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1994). The court stated "[a] member of this court...
requested a poll on the suggestion of rehearing en banc and a majority of the
judges in this court... voted in favor thereof .... " Id.
36. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995).
37. See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
granted and vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995), and aff'd in part and remanded in
part, No. 93-3258, 1995 WL 429103 (3d Cir. July 20, 1995); E.E.O.C. v. Farmers
Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works,
Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994)(discussing and rejecting the Wallace holding).
38. See McKennon v. Nashville Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 882-83 (1995)(stating
that McKennon filed her suit pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988 ed. & Supp.VA)
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988 ed. & Supp. V).
39. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883 (1995).
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court granted the Banner's motion and the Sixth Circuit afrmed.4o
The Supreme Court granted certiorari41 and reversed.42
The Court first noted that the ADEA was part of a statutory con-
gressional scheme to eradicate workplace discrimination. Other stat-
utes fulfilling the same purpose include Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),43 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA),44 the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),45 and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA").46 The Court thus sought not to limit
its focus to a particular act but to give the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine the same treatment under a broad statutory design.47
The Court stated that there are two objects of these remedial stat-
utes: deterrence and compensation for injuries. In this regard, the
Court held that "[it would not accord with this scheme if after-ac-
quired evidence of wrongdoing... operates, in every instance, to bar
all relief for an earlier violation of the Act."48
Though the Court found an employer would not be able to escape
all liability the Court stated, "even though the employer has violated
the Act, we must consider how the after-acquired evidence of the em-
ployee's wrongdoing bears on the specific remedy to be ordered."'49
The Court addressed the concern of the employers who should have
the discretion to hire, promote, and discharge their employees on non-
discriminatory grounds. In this light, the Court held that as a general
rule, reinstatement and front pay would not be appropriate. With re-
gard to backpay, however, the Court stated that "[a]n absolute rule
barring any recovery of backpay... would undermine the ADEA's
40. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), aff'g,
797 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
41. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994).
42. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 ed. & Supp. V). See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub-
lishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995)(noting Title VII is applicable to discrimina-
tion concerning race, color, sex, national origin, and religion).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1988 ed. & Supp. V). See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub-
lishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995)(noting that the ADA is concerned with
disability discrimination).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994). See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,
115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995)(noting that the NLRA is concerned with union
activities).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994). See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,
115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995)(noting the EPA is concerned with sex discrimination).
47. The Court noted the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII and stated,
"[tihe substantive, antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA are modeled upon
the prohibitions of Title VII," McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115
S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995), and "Itihe ADA and Title VII share common substantive
feature and also a common purpose: 'the elimination of discrimination in the
workplace.'" Id. (citation omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 885.
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objective of forcing employers to consider and examine their motiva-
tions, and of penalizing them for employment decisions that spring
from age discrimination."5o The beginning point to determine
backpay should be a calculation from the date of the unlawful dis-
charge to the date the new information [the after-acquired evidence]
was discovered.51
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's opinion in McKennon represents an impor-
tant step toward fulfilling the anti-discriminatory purposes of such
statutes as the ADEA, Title VII, the ADA, and the EPA. Indeed, the
Court made a significant proclamation in holding that after-acquired
evidence should not in every instance relieve employers who have vio-
lated anti-discrimination statutes of all liability.52 While the Court
recognized this limitation on liability, it also recognized that employ-
ers should have the right to discharge employees for non-discrimina-
tory grounds and thus allowed courts to limit a plaintiff's remedies.
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion as to remedies leaves open the pos-
sibility that employers can limit remedies which would otherwise
make the plaintiff whole.53 First, a discussion of why after-acquired
evidence is irrelevant at the liability stage will be presented. Second,
a discussion of the Court's opinion as to remedies will be examined
and a proposal to better calculate the remedy of backpay will be
explored.
A. The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine Is Not Relevant in
Establishing Employer Liability
The Court discussed primarily two reasons why an employee
should not be barred from all relief even though he or she has a past of
employment-related wrongdoing: 1) the purpose of anti-discrimina-
tion statutes, such as the ADEA and Title VII, would not be fulfilled if
after-acquired evidence prohibited any relief; and 2) mixed-motive
cases are inapposite to finding liability under the after-acquired evi-
dence doctrine.
1. After-Acquired Evidence Is Not in Accord with the Dual-
Purpose of Anti-Discrimination Statutes
The Supreme Court has long recognized the two-fold purpose of Ti-
tle VII. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,54 the Court noted that the
50. Id. at 886.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 884.
53. See infra notes 102-142 and accompanying text.
54. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
[Vol. 74:374
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
primary objective of Title VII was designed to "'achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group ... .' "55 In other words, the
statute seeks to deter employers from engaging in discriminatory con-
duct. Second, Title VII was designed to "make persons whole for inju-
ries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination."56
In McKennon the Court reaffirmed this focus. In view of the deter-
rence function, the Court stated that statutes such as Title VII and
the ADEA "serve as a 'spur or catalyst' to cause employers 'to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to en-
deavor to eliminate so far as possible, the last vestiges' of discrimina-
tion."57 With regard to providing compensation, the Court noted that
"an injured employee [has] a right of action to obtain the authorized
relief."18 The Court found that "[tlhe private litigant who seeks re-
dress for his or her injuries vindicates both the deterrence and the
compensation objectives of the ADEA."59
When employers were allowed to evade liability under the after-
acquired evidence doctrine, as the Eighth Circuit held was plausible,6 0
employers were not deterred from discriminating against their em-
ployees, and plaintiffs were not "made whole" via compensation for
their injuries. After all, what incentives would exist for an employer
to comply when a quick check through an employee's personnel file
may resolve the dispute early-that is, before any of the employer's
discriminatory practices are known to a court and to the society in
which the employer does business. A strong deterrence policy is im-
perative to force apathetic employers to educate their workforce and to
discipline the same when violations to another's civil liberties are
made. 61
Last year in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.,62 the Third Cir-
cuit had adopted the reasoning of Wallace and in addition to discuss-
ing the purposes of anti-discrimination statutes, also addressed the
injuries of discrimination victims as well as the public interest in en-
55. Id. at 417 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 418.
57. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995)(quot-
ing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994), and supra
text accompanying notes 23-29.
61. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1235 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
granted and vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995), and aff'd in part and remanded in
part, No. 93-3258, 1995 WL 429103 (3d Cir. Jul. 20, 1995).
62. 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994). Although the Third Circuit affirmed much of its
1994 opinion in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., No. 93-3258, 1995 WL
429103 (3d Cir. Jul. 20, 1995), it is the court's 1994 opinion where the bases for
its decision were discussed.
1995]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
forcement of anti-discrimination statutes. These areas of concern,
only briefly mentioned in McKennon, deserve further elaboration to
supplement why after-acquired evidence is irrelevant at the liability
stage.
a. Injuries in Discrimination Contexts Are Real and Are Not
Erased by Fortuitous After-Acquired Evidence
While the Summers court was correct when it stated that "after-
acquired evidence cannot be said to have been a cause for Summers'
discharge,"63 it did not carry through this logic when it concluded that
the after-acquired evidence "is relevant to Summers' claim of injury,
and does itself preclude the grant of any present relief or remedy to
Summers."64
Logic and common sense should dictate that no matter what the
employee has done by way of misrepresentations or on-the-job miscon-
duct, the employee has also suffered an injury. Although some courts
state that the employee suffers no injury because the defendant either
would not have hired or would have fired the employee once it learned
of the misrepresentation or misconduct,65 this approach is flawed.
The Mardell court rejected this so-called no-standing argument noting
that statutes such as Title VII grant standing to any individual dis-
criminated against by a covered employer, and an employee is defined
as "'an individual employed by an employer.' "66 The court also noted
that there is no exception in Title VII for individuals who would not
have been employed but for their fraud or misconduct.
Further, because the employer in an after-acquired evidence situa-
tion learns of the justification for the employee's firing only after the
employee seeks to assert his or her rights, the employee does suffer a
real injury-"the elimination of his right to bring a successful suit for
63. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988).
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. See generally Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992);
Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); Baab v. AMR Servs.
Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Rich v. Westland Printers, Inc., No.
CIV. A. HAR 92-2475, 1993 WL 220453 (D. Md. June 9, 1993); Benson v. Quanex
Corp., No. 90-CV-71996-DT, 1992 WL 63013 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 1992); Kravit v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., No. CV-92-0038, 1992 WL 390236 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1992);
O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992);
Churchman v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991); Sweeney v. U-
Haul Co., No. 89C3761, 1991 WL 1707 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1991); O'Driscoll v. Her-
cules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990), rev'd, 52 F.3d 294 (10th Cir. 1995);
Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989).
66. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1231 (3d Cir. 1994)(citing 42
U.S.CA § 2000e-2(a) (1981) and 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e(f) (1981)).
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illegal discrimination against his employer."67 Likewise, the Court in
McKennon stated that statutes such as Title VII provide a venue for
employees to illuminate such discriminatory practices in the work-
place. In this regard, the Court noted:
The objectives of the ADEA are furthered when even a single employee estab-
lishes that an employer has discriminated against him or her. The disclosure
through litigation of incidents or practices which violate national policies re-
specting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, for the occur-
rence of violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance resulting from a
misappreciation of the Act's operation or entrenched resistance to its com-
mands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance. The efficacy of its
enforcement mechanisms becomes one more measure of the success of the
Act. 6 8
Whether the employee has made a misrepresentation or not, an
injury has occurred. Justice Arnold of the Eighth Circuit offered this
analogy:
[L]et us assume that Mr. Welch was a tortfeasor: That fact could not possibly
excuse the commission of a tort against him. I doubt that the court would
allow the defendant, for instance, to justify a battery on Mr. Welch on the
ground that he would not have been available for battering but for his misrep-
resentations. I cannot see how this case stands on a different footing.6 9
One would be hardpressed to argue that the employee who suffered
a battery committed by the employer did not at that moment suffer an
injury despite what evidence may later relate to the person's employ-
ment history. The injury occurs at the moment the battery occurs. In
addition to the economic injuries suffered in discrimination cases, an
intangible injury occurs at the moment of discrimination or harass-
ment by the employer. Employment discrimination causes a victim to
suffer a "dehumanizing injury," and causes a significant injury to the
victim's dignity and demoralizes his or her self-esteem.7 0 Even the
Supreme Court previously recognized that discrimination causes
"grave harm" to its victims.71 Just as the employee who endures a
battery has suffered a real injury, the victim who endures employment
discrimination has suffered the same.
67. Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Ac-
quired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 145, 163 (1993).
68. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995). The
Court also stated, "'Tihe private litigant [in Title VII] not only redresses his own
injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discrimina-
tory employment practices.'" Id. at 884 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974)).
69. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1406 (8th Cir. 1994)(Arnold, J.,
dissenting).
70. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1994).
71. See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1872 (1992)(noting that "lilt is be-
yond question that discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, or any
of the other classifications protected by Title VII is an ... invidious practice
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b. There Exists a Public Interest in Refuting Summers
The Court briefly addressed the concern of society in its opinion
when it stated "[tihe ADEA,... as part of an ongoing congressional
effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace, reflects a societal
condemnation of invidious bias in employment decisions."72 Addi-
tionally, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,73 Justice O'Connor noted
that the first purpose of Title VII is to deter conduct identified as con-
trary to "public policy and harmful to society as a whole."74 She con-
tinued by stating that "[t]his Court's decisions under the Equal
Protection Clause have long recognized that whatever the final out-
come of a decisional process, the inclusion of race or sex as a consider-
ation within it harms both society and the individual."75 Additionally,
the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is to promote equality and
to provide for victims of discrimination and harassment in the work-
place, a matter of public interest.76
Further, as the court in Mardell pointed out, the "anti-employment
discrimination laws Congress enacted consequently resonate with a
forceful public policy vilifying discrimination."7 7 The Third Circuit
recognized the fact that Congress has responded to misconceptions de-
veloped through stereotypes and biases by enacting humanitarian
laws designed to "wipe out the inequity of discrimination in employ-
ment, not merely to recompense the individuals so harmed but princi-
pally to deter future violations."78 Recognizing that an employee's
misconduct or fraud could be a wrong against the employer, the
Mardell court added that an employer's discrimination is wrong
against not only the employee, but also society.79
2. Mixed-Motive Cases Are Inapposite in Determining Liability
in the After-Acquired Evidence Context
The Court in McKennon stated that the Summers holding made an
unwarranted extension of Mt. Healthy, for in the latter, the employer
was operating on both a proper motive and an improper one when it
discharged an employee.80 That case was not applicable to McKen-
non's situation; the Court explained, "McKennon's misconduct was not
discovered until after she had been fired. The employer could not have
72. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995).
73. 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989).
74. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
75. Id. at 265.
76. Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 872, 879 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
77. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994).
78. Id. at 1234.
79. Id.
80. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995).
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been motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim
that the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason."81
The Court continued by stating that mixed motive cases82 are in-
apposite to after-acquired evidence cases except, the Court stated, "to
the important extent they underscore the necessity of determining the
employer's motives in ordering the discharge, an essential element in
determining whether the employer violated the federal antidis-
crimination law."83
A number of sources had so previously noted the distinction be-
tween mixed-motive and after-acquired evidence cases including the
Eleventh Circuit in Wallace which stated:
Whereas the Mt. Healthy rule excuses all liability based on what actually
would have happened absent the unlawful motive, the Summers rule goes one
step further: it excuses all liability based on what hypothetically would have
occurred absent the alleged discriminatory motive assuming the employer had
knowledge that it would not acquire until sometime during the litigation aris-
ing from the discharge.8 4
Not only did the Third85 and Ninth86 Circuits adopt this view
before the Supreme Court's opinion in McKennon, the Equal Employ-
81. Id.
82. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Four justices (with Jus-
tice O'Connor and Justice White concurring in the judgment) held that "when a
plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a part in an employ-
ment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if
it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Id. at 258. Hopkins alleged
that sex discrimination was the reason that she was denied a partnership at
Price Waterhouse. However, Price Waterhouse argued that Hopkins lacked in-
terpersonal skills necessary for such a position. Because the lower courts re-
quired the employer to prove it would have made the same decision irrespective
of plaintiff's gender by clear and convincing evidence, the case was remanded.
Justice White explained the difference between mixed-motive cases and pre:
text cases: "In pretext cases, 'the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives,
but not both, were the 'true' motives behind the decision .... In mixed-motives
cases, however, there is no one 'true' motive behind the decision. Instead, the
decision is a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate." Id. at
260 (quoting NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5
(1983)).
See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)(holding in a
pretext case that since the plaintiff met his burden of proving racial discrimina-
tion, and since the employer subsequently then articulated a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection, the employee had another
opportunity on remand to show that the employer's stated reason was in fact
pretext).
83. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
84. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1992).
85. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994). The court
distinguished between "mixed-motive" and "pretext" cases on one hand and after-
acquired evidence cases on the other. The court stated that the employer's prof-
fered, "legitimate" reason, which did not exist at the time of the discharge, could
not have possibly motivated the employer in the after-acquired evidence situa-
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ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),87 as well as a number of
lower courts8 8 and commentators, 8 9 had likewise perspectives. Even
in the Eighth Circuit, Justice Arnold in his dissenting opinion stated,
"I think the objects of deterrence and compensation both require us to
examine a defendant's mind for what it contained, not what it might
have contained, to determine whether he has committed a wrong."90
Further support is also found in arbitration disputes where labor arbi-
trators have stated that the correctness of a discharge "must stand or
fall upon the reason given at the time of the discharge."91
tion. The court held that [a]fter-acquired evidence, simply put, is not relevant in
establishing liability under Title VII ... because the sole question to be answered
at that stage is whether the employer discriminated against the employee on the
basis of an impermissible factor at the instant of the adverse employment action."
Id. at 1228.
The court, however, stated:
[Alfter-acquired evidence of resum6 and/or application fraud or employer
[sic] misconduct on the job is relevant to at least some issues at the rem-
edies stage ... even if it has surfaced after the employer's searching
inquiry in the aftermath of the employer's [sic] unlawful conduct or in
the course of its trial preparation.
Id. at 1238.
86. See E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1994).
87. The EEOC had stated that if an employer terminates an employee on the basis of
a discriminatory motive, and discovers a legitimate basis for termination only
afterward, then the legitimate reason was not a motive for the action as it may
partly have been in a mixed-motive context. EEOC CorPL. MAN. (CCH) 1 2095
(Sept. 1992).
88. See, e.g., Schuessler v. Benchmark Marketing and Consulting, Inc., 243 Neb. 425,
500 N.W.2d 529 (Neb. 1993), where the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that
two federal circuit courts (at that time) had allowed some recovery for plaintiffs
in discriminatory terminations. The Schuessler court remanded the case before it
to determine whether the plaintiff's on-the-job misconduct (sexual harassment of
a co-employee) had occurred and whether that misconduct would justify termina-
tion. The court stated that if both issues were answered affirmatively, then the
plaintiff would be barred from recovery utilizing a Summers approach. The court
distinguished the cases of discriminatory terminations stating "the rationale for
allowing recovery [in those cases] appears to be that the employer should not be
excused from its discrimination; i.e., the employer's liability should not depend on
whether the employee also engaged in misconduct .... That situation is vastly
different from the simple breach of contract action now before us." Id. at 441, 500
N.W.2d at 541 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
89. Other commentators have also opined that courts should separate liability from
remedies. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 67 (stating that courts should never use
after-acquired evidence as a total defense or as a basis for refusing to grant an
injunction, declaratory relief, attorney's fees, and costs); Kenneth G. Parker,
Note, After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases: A State of
Disarray, 72 TFx. L. REv. 403 (1993)(arguing that the proper treatment of after-
acquired evidence would never allow such evidence to affect the employer's
liability).
90. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994).
91. See In re Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 3 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)(103 Lab. Arb.)
104 (Oct. 12, 1994)(Fullmer, Arb.)(quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
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The Court's rejection of an employer's reliance on its after-acquired
good fortune comports with common sense. An employer who termi-
nates someone solely because she is, for example, Hispanic, and then
discovers months or even years later that the employee had made a
false application or was stealing from the company cash register, has
not the benefit of a lawful reason for the original discharge. The dis-
charge was simply discriminatory and would be, in this example, in
violation of Title VII. It was only good fortune for the employer that
the plaintiff had a tainted background, and good fortune should not be
the basis for granting summary judgment in favor of the employer.
The employer is just as culpable whether or not the employee is later
found to have been fraudulent.92
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,93 had
essentially confirmed that the Mt. Healthy principle was applicable to
Title VII.94 Though Summers was on a faulty footing when it relied
on Mt. Healthy, it should now be apparent that even the Mt. Healthy
decision has crumbled. Though unaddressed in McKennon, the analy-
sis underlying the mixed-motive cases was altered by Congress when
it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.95 The Act now provides in
pertinent part that "an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) for the proposition that the arbitrator should not
consider evidence not relied on by the employer in ordering the discharge). There
is, however, a difference between arbitration disputes and court disputes which
must be noted. First, arbitration disputes arise due to a violation of a collective
bargaining agreement; in other words, the parties have had the opportunity to
negotiate terms long before the dispute arises. The Supreme Court noted that
evidentiary matters were left to the arbitrator under the agreement and that
"[tihe parties bargained for arbitration ... and were free to set the procedural
rules for arbitrators to follow if they chose." United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987).
Second, arbitration is usually a precursor to termination. Neither collective
bargaining nor neutral liaisons typify the majority of employer-employee rela-
tionships where the parties are governed by employment at-will doctrine. The
arbitrator in Columbus rejected the employer's reliance on the Sixth Circuit cases
where employers defeated claims utilizing the doctrine of after-acquired evi-
dence. The arbitrator noted such a difference and stated that "each of these cases
[in the Sixth Circuit] involved statutory interpretation (Rehabilitation Act, Title
VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act) rather than arbitration under
labor agreements." In re Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 3 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA)(103 Lab. Arb.) 104 (Oct. 12, 1994)(Fullmer, Arb.)(emphasis added).
92. Though the Eighth Circuit recognized this logic when it stated that "[iun the af-
ter-acquired evidence context, the employer knows only the presumed illegal
ground for the discharge," Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403,
1405 (8th Cir. 1994), the court misapplied this reasoning at the liability stage in
following the Summers rationale.
93. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
94. Id. at 247-50.
95. See McGinley, supra note 67, at 187 (stating that "Price Waterhouse was one of
the cases that Congress amended through its legislative action.").
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sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."9 6 The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed to "strengthen and improve Fed-
eral civil rights laws, to provide for damages in cases of intentional
employment discrimination. . . ."97 and to expand "the scope of rele-
vant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to
victims of discrimination."9 s Thus, even though an after-acquired evi-
dence case should not be subjected to the same analytical scrutiny of a
mixed-motive case, it is evident that the underpinnings of mixed-mo-
tive cases have been subjected to legislative revamping.
B. The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine Is Only Minimally
Relevant When Examining Equitable Remedies and
Should Be Completely Irrelevant When
Awarding Legal Remedies
Since the range of available remedies may vary slightly with the
particular statute a plaintiff invokes, this section will be analyzed by
examining individual remedies and discussing why certain remedies
should not be limited in discrimination cases.99  Underlying this
analysis are two guiding statements. The first comes from the earlier
Supreme Court opinion in Albemarle which noted that "where feder-
ally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the
beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief."10 0 Second, one should take heed of the
words of caution expressed by the Third Circuit: "The court should, of
course, be cautious [in determining plaintiff's remedies] lest the reme-
dies evidence affect the liability verdict.3lol
1. Equitable Remedies
a. Backpay
Twenty years ago, the Court inAlbemarle had stated that once un-
lawful discrimination has been determined, backpay should be denied
96. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991 & Supp. 1994)(emphasis added)).
97. McGinley, supra note 67, at 186 (quoting Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071 (1991)).
98. McGinley, supra note 67, at 186 (quoting Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)).
99. The guiding policy goals of Title VII, to eradicate discrimination and to make
plaintiff whole when discrimination does occur, see Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), and supra text accompanying notes 54-56, provide
the framework to discussing which remedies are available to a plaintiff and to
what extent they should be awarded.
100. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418 (1975)(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
101. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994).
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only for reasons which would "not frustrate the central statutory
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and
making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimina-
tion."10 2 Noting that the "make whole" provision of Title VII is reaf-
firmed by legislative history, the Court stated:
In dealing with the present section 706(g) [of Title VII] the courts have
stressed that the scope of relief under that section of the Act is intended to
make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attainment
of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful
employment practice complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved
by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far
as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for
the unlawful discrimination.1 03
In McKennon, however, the Court provides no clear focus as to how
to adequately fulfill this "make whole" provision. In its discussion of
backpay, a two-paragraph devotion, the Court does once again ac-
knowledge that backpay should restore the employee to the position
he or she would have been in absent the discrimination.O 4 However,
almost apologetically, the Court states that the make-whole purpose
of compensation "is difficult to apply with precision where there is af-
ter-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to termina-
tion on legitimate grounds had the employer known about it."05 The
Court's only answer is as follows: 'The beginning point in the trial
court's formulation of a remedy should be calculation of backpay from
the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information
was discovered."o6
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has also
focused on the date the new information was discovered as a termina-
tion date for backpay. It states that if a plaintiff is terminated for
discriminatory reasons, and the employer later discovers misconduct
such as theft, then the employer would not be subject to backpay after
the date of the discovered theft if it established it had an absolute
policy of firing anyone who commits a theft.07 This view, however, is
short-sighted. Based on this approach, an employer who did not know
of the theft at the time of its discriminatory termination, and who only
learned of such theft because of its discrimination, would in this case
be encouraged to rifle through the employee's personnel files and in-
terrogate the employee's co-workers and supervisors at any later date
in time to find any indication which could limit the employee's
backpay period. Plaintiff's backpay could be limited to a mere day or
102. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
103. Id.
104. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. EEOC COrpL. MAN. (CCH) T 2095 (Sept. 1992).
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two which would indeed have a chilling effect on employees who have
legitimate discriminatory claims.
While the McKennon opinion does acknowledge this dilemma, the
Court's opinion leaves open the possibility that victims of employment
discrimination will not be made whole. The Court tersely states:
The concern that employers might as a routine matter undertake extensive
discovery into an employee's background or performance on the job to resist
claims under the Act is not an insubstantial one, but we think the authority of
the courts to award attorney's fees.., and in appropriate cases to invoke the
provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will deter most
abuses. 108
The Court does not delineate how attorney's fees or Rule 11 sanc-
tions will make employees whole in their discrimination claims. First,
the reference to Rule 11 sanctions seems ineffective to fulfill this pur-
pose. According to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
attorney may be sanctionedo 9 if the attorney presents a pleading, mo-
tion or other paper which is presented for any improper purpose such
as to harass or cause delay or increase the cost of litigation; or if the
pleading, motion, or paper is not warranted under existing law or is a
frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law or establishment of new law; or that factual contentions
have no evidentiary support.110
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 ("Committee Notes")
state that the amendment requires the litigants to "stop-and-think"
before initially making legal or factual contentions.111 However, a
search for after-acquired evidence is not making a legal or factual con-
tention. It is simply not improper to search for what may be relevant
information to limit a plaintiff's remedies. Thus the employer who
finds, through informal discovery, that it has a remedial safeguard in
the after-acquired evidence doctrine should not be subject to Rule 11
sanctions in the first place. Additionally, even if the search could be
remotely characterized as improper, plaintiffs' attorneys will not even
know of the employer's in-house search unless evidence of wrongdoing
is found and used. An attempt to hinge a sanction on the result of
evidence rather than the conduct seems an awkward approach. Fur-
ther, the Committee Notes explain that Rule 11 also provides "protec-
tion against sanctions if [attorneys] withdraw or correct contentions
108. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 887 (1995).
109. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (emphasis added). The 1994 amendment to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made the sanctions under the Rule discretionary
as opposed to mandatory. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983)(stating that "[ilf a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it...
an appropriate sanction. . . .")(emphasis added).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Committee Notes).
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after a potential violation is called to their attention."112 Thus, even if
the defense is later found to be invalid, Rule 11 provides that the vio-
lating party receive notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.113
Additionally, the focus of Rule 11, like that of attorney's fees, is to
deter attorney abuses, not to make plaintiffs whole. The Committee
Notes state, "Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather
than to compensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is
imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty."114 Only
under unusual circumstances will the person violating the rule be re-
quired to make payment to those injured. The Committee Notes con-
tinue, "Any such award to another party, however, should not exceed
the expenses and attorneys' fees for the services directly and unavoid-
ably caused by the violation ... .115 Even in the unusual case where
1) there is a sanction found and 2) costs are paid to the plaintiff's at-
torney instead of the court, the plaintiff will not be made whole in its
backpay award by having sanctions paid to his or her attorney when
that attorney's services would be unnecessary in the first place if no
discrimination had occurred.
The Court also states that an award of attorney's fees may prevent
employers from engaging in post-discharge discovery into the plain-
tiff's background. Although the opinion is silent as to the matter, one
can imagine that an award of attorney's fees will make it more costly
for an employer to depose fature witnesses. For example, when an
employer deposes the plaintiff's supervisor, the employer will presum-
ably have to pay for the plaintiff's attorney to attend the deposition,
thus making it more expensive for the employer to conduct depositions
on the issue of after-acquired evidence.
Assuming this resolution is what the Court implied, it still leaves
much room for inequity for employees with valid discrimination
claims. First, the discretion to award attorney's fees comes from the
courts. Although attorney's fees are generally awarded to plaintiffs in
discrimination cases,116 courts may begin to exercise such discretion
when presented with an employer who has an upstanding reputation
in the community and a plaintiff who has been stealing from the com-
pany for years. Or a court may decide to award attorney's fees for
conducting depositions but not for the amount of time it would take a
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. CHAs A. SuLLIvAN ET AL., FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIScRMn-
NATION § 9.8, at 570-71 (1980)(stating that appellate courts have narrowly con-
strued any exceptions).
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plaintiff's attorney to verify a false r6sum6.1 1 7 What the Court's an-
swer provides is at the very least an opportunity for inequity among
similarly situated plaintiffs.
Second, and more importantly, the Court's approach to backpay
does not comply with the purpose of the discrimination statutes: to
make the plaintiff whole. To explain, an award of attorney's fees only
becomes relevant when the plaintiff's attorney becomes involved.
During informal discovery, the employer who wishes to find after-ac-
quired evidence can still interrogate an employee's co-workers and su-
pervisors. It can still dig through the employee's application and
r~sum6 and verify information. During this time, which could only be
a few days, it only costs the employer its own time; this was the case
prior to McKennon anyway. And as McKennon now implies, a court
should begin to fashion a backpay remedy from the date the employee
is unlawfully discharged to the date the employer actually discovers
the after-acquired evidence. Logically, an employer will still conduct
such in-house discovery; the employer will want to know what de-
fenses it has to limit plaintiff's remedies and how it can utilize this
defense quickly.
What the Court's solution does is allow the employer to engage in
informal discovery into the plaintiff's past and, upon finding after-ac-
quired evidence, then decide whether the cost of extra attorney fees
using the after-acquired evidence doctrine would be more or less than
the difference between the full backpay award without the defense
and a limited backpay award with the defense. When the employer
focuses on one or two deponents or restricts its r6sum6 investigations
to the damaging source, the attorney's fees it may be required to ex-
pend on a valid defense (if a court even decides to award attorney's
fees) may be far less than the outlay for additional backpay given the
amount of time between either 1) the discharge and settlement if the
employer does not defend against the discrimination charge or 2) the
discharge and the judgment of the court if the employer defends on the
discrimination charge and loses. In fact, given the length of time suits
take, the employer who decides to defend against the discrimination
claim will still likely be encouraged to rely on after-acquired evidence;
if it loses on the underlying claim, at least it won't lose a substantial
amount of backpay.
In any event, this result does not focus on the employee by at-
tempting to put him or her in the same position he or she would have
been absent the discrimination. If the employee was never discrimi-
nated against, the employee would not need the services of an attor-
ney in the first place. Moreover, if the employee was never
117. At the very least, the award of attorney's fees must be "reasonable on the basis of
the time necessarily spent and the nature of the effort required." STuART M.
SPEISER, ATroNEys' Fa.s § 14:41, at 65-66 (1973).
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discriminated against, the after-acquired evidence would never have
been discovered. Thus, relieving the employee of additional attorney's
fees does not seem to fulfill the statutory purpose of making the plain-
tiff whole again for the discrimination he or she has suffered with re-
spect to backpay. Instead, the Court's opinion simply focuses on the
employer and forces it to engage in an economic analysis to determine
which venue will cost it less.
The Court characterizes the employer's investigations into the dis-
charged employee's past as "abuses" on the part of the employer.1'8
However, it hardly seems an abuse on the part of the employer to en-
gage in discovery and conduct an economic analysis to limit its liabil-
ity. It seems natural to search for after-acquired evidence if the cutoff
date for backpay is to be the date the after-acquired evidence was ac-
tually discovered. Although the Court states 1) that this beginning
calculation may be affected by "extraordinary equitable circumstances
... of either party,"'1 9 and 2) relies on possible deterrents such as
Rule 11 and attorney's fees, there seems to be another more equitable
solution to the problem of establishing backpay-one which better
serves the make-whole provisions of anti-discrimination statutes and
encourages employers to be more careful in the first place.
In 1992, the court in Wallace attempted to apply the "make whole"
provision of Title VII and did not limit its backpay analysis to the date
the after-acquired evidence was discovered. The Wallace court deter-
mined that the employer could limit the total amount of backpay due
to a plaintiff if it could establish that "it would have discovered the
after-acquired evidence prior to what would otherwise be the end of
the backpay period in the absence of the allegedly unlawful acts and
this litigation."12o In its brief to the Supreme Court, Petitioner in Mc-
Kennon notes that under Wallace, backpay will cut off at the point in
118. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 887 (1995)(stating
that Rule 11 sanctions and an award of attorney's fees will deter most abuses).
119. Id. at 886.
120. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992)(emphasis ad-
ded). However, after McKennon, the Eleventh Circuit did not carry through with
this logic. Citing Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir.
1995), the Eleventh Circuit stated:
We join the Fifth Circuit in concluding that "the pertinent inquiry... is
whether the employee would have been fired upon discovery of the
wrongdoing, not whether he would have been hired in the first instance."
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's acknowledgement
that the two dates which are relevant for the purpose of calculating
backpay are the date of termination and the date that the employer dis-
covered the fraud.
Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 379 n.8 (11th Cir. 1995)(citations omit-
ted). Although the court notes the "would have been fired" timeframe, it follows
the Supreme Court in stating that the cutoff date for backpay is the date of actual
discovery of the wrongdoing. Although the Eleventh Circuit must follow the
Supreme Court, the two approaches are not "consistent" as the Court states.
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time at which, but for the discrimination, the employer would have
discovered the relevant information and would have dismissed the
employee. The implication of this assertion is 1) that the employer
would have discovered the misrepresentation or misconduct on its own
accord, and 2) the plaintiff's action would justify grounds for dismis-
sal. Though the Wallace court did not specify what type or quantum of
evidence would need be set forth by an employer who sought to limit
this period of backpay, it is necessary to examine what level of proof
should be required by employers at the two different stages: 1) the
discovery stage, and 2) the dismissal stage.
With regard to the first stage, the initial approach should first be to
focus on that point in time when the plaintiff would have lost his or
her job for non-discriminatory reasons,121 if that can be determined.
For example, if the employer had a prescheduled date that it was go-
ing out of business (and it in fact did do so), then the plaintiff's
backpay should be limited to that date of closing.122 Of course, the
problems do not typically arise with this situation. Indeed, the em-
ployer will usually try to show that it would have discovered the mis-
representation or misconduct on its own accord even without a specific
and concrete date.
The would-have discovered analysis must be circumscribed to pro-
tect the employee. When a court receives evidence that an employer
would have discovered the plaintiff's misrepresentation or on-the-job
misconduct despite the fact plaintiff has begun a suit against the em-
ployer, it must be recognized that this will be a clear and open invita-
tion for the employer to participate in post-hoc evaluations to justify
its asserted defense. As the old adage goes, hindsight is 20/20. With a
clear focus, an employer would likely assert numerous contentions of
when and how it would have found plaintiff's misconduct or misrepre-
sentation. Since mere speculation or even a high degree of probability
should not limit the plaintiff's backpay award,123 any proffered reason
121. See Brief for Petitioner at *35-36, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,
No. 93-1543, 1994 WL 385636 (July 21, 1994).
122. Id. at *36. Additionally, Petitioner noted that even reducing a backpay award
due to the discovery of after-acquired evidence would be inconsistent with Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. Petitioner stated:
[Alctions taken by an employer in violation of federal anti-discrimination
law may understandably prompt a response by the intended victim of
that statutory violation, including steps to protect his or her legal rights.
Where an employer in turn seizes that response as providing a justifica-
tion for dismissal, the entire train of events is one that would not have
occurred "but for" the original statutory violation. In at least some cir-
cumstances it would be inappropriate to reduce the remedy accorded to a
discrimination victim merely because of his or her response to that
violation.
Brief for Petitioner at *37.
123. But see Parker, supra note 89, at 439 (stating that speculation is an inherent part
of determining liability and remedy, and so speculation concerning the role of
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by the employer to limit backpay because it would have discovered the
misrepresentation or misconduct should consequently be proved by
clear and convincing evidence.12 4
Subjecting the employer to this higher burden of proof at the dis-
covery stage is not contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Price
Waterhouse. There the Court held that the employer in a mixed-mo-
tive case must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimi-
nation.12 5 At this stage of analysis, however, the only concern is
whether the employer would have discovered the hidden information,
not whether the employer would have acted on it. By subjecting the
employer to this initial higher burden to prove it would have discov-
ered the hidden evidence, we can strive to guarantee the make-whole
provisions of statutes such as Title VII, while at the same time re-
specting the employer whose anticipated actions would bring it closer
to the employer whose backpay outlay would terminate because it was
going out of business.
The clear and convincing standard at the discovery stage seems
also the better alternative than the actual discovery date of the mis-
conduct. First, as stated previously, attorney's fees and Rule 11 sanc-
tions do not serve to make the plaintiff whole. Second, even if
"extraordinary equitable circumstances" urge a court to alter the
plaintiff's backpay award, it would seem likely that a court would look
to the "would have discovered" date anyway to form its calculation.
With that view, some courts may adopt a preponderance test while
others may opt for the higher burden. Stating instead that backpay
will be cutoff at the date that the employer, by clear and convincing
evidence, "would have discovered" the misconduct, both safeguards
against short-changing the plaintiff in his or her backpay award, and
forces employers to enact and follow more uniform screening policies
and procedures to meet its burden of proof.
after-acquired evidence should be within the range of courts' fact-finding
capabilities).
124. One commentator has argued that if the employer can prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have discovered the misrepresentation without the
ensuing litigation, then that should be the cut off date for awarding backpay. See
McGinley, supra note 67, at 197. The danger of this lower burden of proof, how-
ever, is that it could encourage employers to shop for reasons to state it would
have discovered the misrepresentation. Another commentator, however, has also
suggested that the clear and convincing evidence standard be used. See Cheryl
Y, Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimina-
tion Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsi-
bility, 46 STAN. L. Rv. 175, 209-10 (1993)(drawing no distinction between the
discovery stage and the dismissal stage, Zemelman argues that during the relief
determination, either the higher burden should be used or that the preponder-
ance standard should be applied more rigorously).
125. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989).
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With regard to the second stage, it becomes necessary to inquire
whether plaintiff's actions would justify a dismissal. The Court in Mc-
Kennon found that for an employer to rely upon after-acquired evi-
dence, it must establish that the conduct was "of such severity that
the employee in fact would have been terminated . ..."126 However,
stating that conduct must be severe does not establish what level of
proof needs to be shown by the employer that it would have dis-
charged the employee. For example, an employer may seek to dis-
charge a particular employee for lying on an employment application.
This may be considered "severe" but if other current employees have
also lied on their applications and still remain at work, then the em-
ployer has not proven it "would have discharged" the employee in
question regardless of the alleged severity. Indeed, an employer's sin-
gle affidavit written after the fact should not be sufficient to establish
the fact that the employer would have fired the individual. In its
Supreme Court brief, the petitioner in McKennon warned against this
practice:
[An affidavit which merely asserts in conclusory terms that an employer
would have dismissed the plaintiff is not by itself sufficient to meet that bur-
den. Such a bald assertion may reflect, not any consideration of the em-
ployer's past practices, but only the witness's personal attitude toward the
plaintiff, an attitude all too likely colored by the charge of discrimination or an
understandable desire to limit the defendant's liability. 1 2 7
The Welch court also stated that "the employer bears a substantial
burden of establishing that the policy pre-dated the hiring and firing
of the employee in question and that the policy constitutes more than
mere contract or employment application boilerplate.1 2s Rather than
the focus being on the severity of the misconduct, the proper analysis
seems whether the employer can prove it would have discharged the
employee. In this regard, it is still important to examine the burden of
proof required.
In its earlier opinion in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held
that the employer could limit its backpay award if it proved that by a
preponderance of the evidence, it would have made the same decision
to dismiss the plaintiff.l29 However, there are two notable concerns
with relaxing the burden of proof.
First, the mixed-motive case and the after-acquired evidence case
are not the same analytically. Even the Court in McKennon takes
126. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995).
127. Brief for Petitioner at *47, McKennon (No. 93-1543).
128. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1406 (8th Cir. 1994)(emphasis
added)(finding that the employer's single self-serving affidavit did not substanti-
ate the "would not have hired" analysis).
129. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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note that a mixed-motive analysis is inapposite. 130 It is noted that
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an employer in a mixed-motive
case who meets the preponderance burden can deny an employee's
remedies, including the denial of backpay.131 Thus, today's employer
may have a chance to escape the outlay of backpay when it has both a
legitimate motive and illegitimate motive operating simultane-
ously.13 2 Perhaps this makes sense in a mixed-motive case, because
on the date of discharge there was a valid, non-discriminatory reason
to terminate the plaintiff and so the backpay award would essentially
be moot. However, in the after-acquired evidence context, there is
only a discriminatory motive in operation during the backpay period
until the employer is "fortunate" enough to discover a valid reason for
the termination.
Second, the preponderance standard has been applied when society
has minimal concern with the case, and the parties share equal risk,
which is not the case in employment discrimination cases. 133 Further,
the Court in Price Waterhouse implied that a higher standard of proof
may be required when determining a plaintiff's remedies. 3 4 The
Court in that case rejected authorities seeking a higher standardl35
stating that "each of these sources deals with the proper determina-
tion of relief rather than with the initial finding of liability .... Be-
cause we have held that.., the employer [in Price Waterhouse] may
avoid a finding of liability altogether and not simply avoid certain eq-
uitable relief, these authorities do not help .... "-3 6 Specifically, the
Court noted that an earlier Supreme Court decision stated that there
is a "clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to estab-
lish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage and the mea-
sure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount."137
130. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879,885 (1995)(stating
that mixed motive cases are inapposite except to the extent they underscore the
necessity of determining the employer's motives in ordering the discharge).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1991 & Supp. 1994). See also McGinley, supra
note 67, at 187 (referring to various sections of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and
noting that the employer in the mixed-motive case is not subject to back pay
among other remedies); EEOC COmpL. MAN. (CCH) 9 2095 (Sept. 1992)(recogniz-
ing that the new Act makes clear that employers will not have to provide back
pay in mixed-motive cases).
132. See supra note 131.
133. Zemelman, supra note 124, at 210.
134. Id.
135. The Court stated that an EEOC regulation, codified at 29 CFR § 1613.271(c)(2)
(1988), does require "federal agencies proved to have violated Title VII to show by
clear and convincing evidence that an individual employee is not entitled to re-
lief." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253-54 (1989).
136. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 254 (1989)(emphasis added).
137. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989)(citing Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931)). See Zemelman,
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Further, in Nanty v. Barrows Co.,138 the court in a pretext case
stated that at the relief stage, a heavier burden should be imposed on
the employer. The court stated that where the job applicant proves
unlawful discrimination, he must be awarded full relief, unless the
employer proves by clear and convincing evidence otherwise.13 9 Addi-
tionally, a concurring opinion in Toney v. Block,140 stated that a clear
and convincing standard furthers Title VII's deterrent purpose and
discourages unlawful conduct by employers "[bly making it more diffi-
cult for employers to defeat successful plaintiffs' claims to retroactive
relief."141 A substantial burden, rather than merely a preponderance
standard, makes sense; otherwise, it would again be too simple for em-
ployers to engage in a quick post-hoc evaluation and have a personnel
director years later state that the employee would have been
terminated.
Thus, to safeguard the plaintiff's interest and the employer's de-
sire to engage in post-hoc evaluations, the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard seems to be the better approach to determine the
plaintiff's remedies in the after-acquired evidence context. Therefore,
the employer should be able to limit backpay to the date it would have
found the hidden information only if it can show by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that it would have made the same decision to dismiss the
plaintiff in the absence of discrimination.142
Therefore, backpay may be limited in certain circumstances, but
only providing that the employer can show 1) that it would have ter-
minated the employee for non-discriminatory reasons (such as a busi-
ness closing) or 2) by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have
discovered the misrepresentation or misconduct on its own accord and
it would have terminated the employee under objective, pre-set com-
pany policies. This formula not only puts the onus upon employers to
prove backpay limitations, it serves to make the plaintiffs in these
cases whole without simply paying attorney's fees for services which
would be irrelevant in the absence of discrimination.
b. Reinstatement
Reinstatement is a difficult issue. Although the employer came
upon plaintiff's misrepresentation or misconduct via its own discrimi-
supra note 124, at 210 (noting the difference between the two Supreme Court
decisions).
138. 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
139. Id. at 1333.
140. 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 1373 (Tamm, J., concurring).
142. Although one commentator would also limit back pay at the "date of presumed
discovery," McGinley, supra note 67, at 197, she does not draw a distinction be-
tween the discovery stage and the dismissal stage.
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nation, it would be impossible to expect an employer to close its eyes to
the information it learned. Additionally, one cannot overlook that re-
instatement may be particularly invasive to an employer's right to ter-
minate an employee at-will.143 The Court in McKennon states that
"[i]t would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstate-
ment of someone the employer would have terminated, and will termi-
nate, in any event and upon lawful grounds."144 Although the Court
recognized that factual permutations and equitable considerations
may allow reinstatement, it concluded that as a general rule, rein-
statement would not be appropriate.
Arguably, reinstatement of an employee who would never have
been hired or who would have been fired goes beyond the make-whole
provision of statutes such as Title VII and the ADEA. On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit noted the possibilities of such an equitable
consideration. The Court stated that it would make no sense to allow
an employer to refuse to reinstate an employee who had properly per-
formed her job for twenty years just because a generation earlier she
had exaggerated her education in order to work to support her fam-
ily.14 5 This is definitely different, continued the court, from the Sum-
mers example of a doctor practicing without a license wherein no
hospital could by law be required to reinstate him.146 In the latter
case, it is obvious that the plaintiff would not legally be allowed
reinstatement.
Although the Court was probably practical in its view that rein-
statement will generally not be appropriate, perhaps the analysis
should begin with the "factual permutations and equitable considera-
tions." In this vein, two factors should measure the plausibility of re-
instatement: 1) the relevancy of the misconduct or misrepresentation
in relation to the job done by the plaintiff; and 2) whether the em-
ployee-employer relationship will be frustrated.
With regard to the first factor, it should be noted that relevancy
should extend beyond mere reliance by the employer as the Sixth Cir-
cuit exemplified in Johnson.14 7 Instead, the focus should concentrate
on the relationship between the plaintiff's particular job duties and
the misrepresentation or misconduct. With respect to the second fac-
tor, one commentator has suggested that in lieu of reinstatement, the
court should award front pay as a surrogate since the denial of rein-
statement came about only because of the employee's claim against
143. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d Cir. 1994).
144. McKennon v. Nashville Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995).
145. See E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1994).
146. Id. at 901-02.
147. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. For a discussion relating materi-
ality to the termination issue, see Parker, supra note 89, at 437-38.
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the company.-4 8 Without any explanation, the Court in McKennon
simply stated that front pay would not be appropriate. However,
frontpay may be an appropriate solution when the practicalities of
reinstating an otherwise eligible employee whom the employer now
knows should be fired would frustrate the employer-employee rela-
tionship.149 At the very least, frontpay should be considered with the
facts and equities of each case. Where awarded, the award of front
pay in this instance should be based on the backpay formula; that is,
the employee should be paid up through the time the employer would
have discovered, by clear and convincing evidence, the misrepresenta-
tion or misconduct, in the absence of the discrimination claim. In this
respect, the employee is again made whole. Also, by focusing on this
time period rather than the time of trial, the employee is not penalized
by living in a non-litigious state where trials are resolved faster which
would reduce the frontpay award. Of course, it should also be noted
that under the anti-discrimination statutes, it is up to the court's dis-
cretion to award this relief. In cases where the employee-employer
relationship would not be harmed and the materiality of misrepresen-
tation or misconduct is but relatively nominal, reinstatement should
remain an encouraged and plausible option despite the Court's gen-
eral denial.150
c. Injunctions and Declaratory Relief
The Wallace court, denying reinstatement, stated that because the
plaintiff would no longer be an employee, she would not be entitled to
an injunction.1 53 However, the court can use its discretion to effectu-
ate the policies of such anti-discrimination statutes and should be able
to do so despite the fact that reinstatement of the employee may not be
appropriate. For example, section 706(g) of Title VII states that "the
court may enjoin a respondent from engaging in an unlawful employ-
148. McGinley, supra note 67, at 197-98.
149. See Parker, supra note 89, at 440-41 (stating that "it would be acceptable to
award front pay as an alternative to reinstatement on the basis of un-
workability"). Id. at 441.
150. See EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1225 (Oct. 1988)(stating that under section
706(g) of Title VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1994)), the
court may order reinstatement, and under section 7(b) of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. sec. 626(b) (1985 & Supp. 1994)), a
court may order reinstatement or promotion).
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would also deny reinstatement to a
plaintiff whose employer in a mixed-motive case provided that it would have ter-
minated plaintiff for nondiscriminatory reasons, after-acquired evidence cases
are doctrinally distinct from mixed motive cases. See supra notes 130-37 and
accompanying text. Thus reinstatement does and should remain a viable option
for the after-acquired evidence victim.
151. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992).
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ment practice .... "-152 Other statutes also give the court this author-
ity.153 Additionally, since society has itself an interest in eradicating
discrimination, it should be able to prevent employers from such prac-
tice, even though reinstatement of a particular plaintiff is not appro-
priate. The EEOC can voice society's concerns, for it also has an
interest.1 54
2. Legal Relief
The Court does not include any specific discussion of legal relief in
its McKennon opinion. However, the Court noted that under the
controlling discrimination statute (the ADEA in McKennon), the court
can grant such "legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate
.... "155 As explained below, legal relief should remain an appropri-
ate remedy for the courts to employ.
a. Compensatory Damages
While after-acquired evidence may, in some circumstances, limit a
plaintiff's equitable remedies, after-acquired evidence should not limit
a plaintiff's damages.15 6 Damages are incurred where harm has oc-
curred. As noted in the section discussing employer liability, plaintiffs
suffer real injuries in discrimination and harassment cases.1 5 7 These
injuries suffered by plaintiffs of discrimination and harassment were
sustained due to the employer's actions. No matter what potential
misrepresentation or misconduct an employer may find later during
discovery, it cannot escape the fact that it has injured the plaintiff and
must fulfill its obligations with respect to such injuries incurred. As
petitioner in McKennon has noted:
152. EEOC CompL. MAN. (CCH) S 1225 (Oct. 1988).
153. EEOC COmpL. MAN. (CCH) T1 1225 (Oct. 1988)(stating that "under [section 17] of
the FLSA [Fair Labor Standards Act], the EEOC may seek an injunction... to
restrain a respondent from violating any of the provisions of the EPA plus the
payment of the back wages due, plus interest.").
154. See McGinley, supra note 67, at 196 n.340 (referencing E.E.O.C. Policy Guide,
405:6915, 6927 (July 7, 1992) which states that the "E.E.O.C. will seek injunctive
and declaratory relief to prevent employers from discriminating similarly in the
future").
155. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995).
156. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
would also deny damages to a plaintiff whose employer proved in a mixed-motive
case that it would have terminated plaintiff for nondiscriminatory reasons. Be-
cause after-acquired evidence cases are doctrinally distinct from mixed motive
cases, damages do and should remain a viable option for the after-acquired evi-
dence victim.
157. With specific reference to harassment cases, Congress has stated that harass-
ment could cause emotional pain, suffering, and anguish. Brief for Petitioner at
*34, McKennon (No. 93-1543)(quoting 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3)).
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[Emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoy-
ment of life, and nonpecuniary losses are not] injuries that would have been
sustained had respondent merely dismissed petitioner for the alleged miscon-
duct, whether that dismissal had occurred at the time of the actual discharge
... or when the after-acquired information was first invoked .... Respondent
contends only that it would have discharged petitioner on the basis of that
information; respondent does not assert that ... it would have subjected peti-
tioner to a protracted period of harassment before firing her. Thus the after-
acquired evidence on which respondent relies does not affect the undeniable
fact that only an award of damages can restore petitioner to the position she
would have been in had the harassment not occurred.
1 5 8
Further, in Farmer Bros.,159 the Ninth Circuit held that "although
after-acquired evidence of application fraud, if proven to be material,
might limit the employee's right to reinstatement and to frontpay,
such evidence does not relieve a defendant who has been found liable
for employment discrimination from paying other forms of dam-
ages."160 Such other damages may include compensatory damages for
"future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary
losses."161 Further, as is noted below, an employer will have its own
recourse against the employee.
b. Liquidated and Punitive Damages
"Under Section 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a [plaintiff will be]
entitled to punitive damages if he or she establishes that the employer
engaged in discrimination 'with malice or with reckless indifference to
the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."
62
Although punitive damages and other remedies will not be awarded in
a mixed motive case where the employer proves that the employee was
terminated for a non-discriminatory reason,16 3 it has already been es-
tablished that an after-acquired evidence situation is doctrinally dis-
tinct from the mixed-motive case. As the EEOC has stated, when the
employer's sole motivation was discriminatory, 16 4 which is definitely
the case in after-acquired evidence situations, and if it acted with
158. Brief for Petitioner at *34.
159. E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 901.
161. Parker, supra note 89, at 425-26 & n.138 (recognizing such types of compensatory
damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)
(1991 & Supp. 1994)) and noting that the 1991 Act places limits on the amounts
to plaintiffs).
162. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1 2095 (Sept. 1992). However, the Supreme Court,
finding no congressional intent otherwise, has held that section 102 of the 1991
Civil Rights Act is not retroactive. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483,
1508 (1994).
163. See EEOC COmPL. MAN. (CCH) 91 2095 (Sept. 1992).
164. Id.
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"malice or with reckless indifference"16 5 to the employee, then puni-
tive damages may be awarded. The focus here is on the employer's
acts. As the award of compensatory damages seeks to further the
make-whole provision of Title VII, the award of punitive damages
seeks to further the second purpose: namely, to deter discrimination
in the workplace. Other statutes also provide for such punitive-type
relief.166 Again, no matter what skeletons the plaintiff has in his or
her own employment closet, the fact remains that the employer has
discriminated; if it has done so willfully or maliciously or with reckless
indifference,1 67 it should be assessed such penalties as are authorized
under the appropriate statute.
c. Employer's Recourse Lies Not in Its Fortuity of Finding a
Tainted Plaintiff but Rather in Its Own Claims
One may argue that plaintiffs with tainted pasts should not receive
such a monetary benefit. However, the fact that after-acquired evi-
dence comes to surface later should not limit a plaintiff's legal reme-
dies; there are other ways to balance the scales. To explain, assume a
terminated employee filed a Title VII action after he was discrimi-
nated against solely due to religious reasons. After discovery com-
mences, the employer finds that the employee had stolen some
equipment. Rather than deny plaintiff the right to have punitive and
compensatory damages assessed against the employer, the more logi-
cal course of action would seem to be to allow the employer to seek his
own damages in the form of a counterclaim and seek recompense
against the plaintiff for his wrongdoing.168
Now suppose the same employee had not stolen equipment but
rather had lied on his employment application. One may assert that
the employer has suffered no "injury." This may or may not be true.
The employer can, in this case, bring its own action for fraud against
the plaintiff. As part of meeting its claim of damages, the employer
165. Id.
166. See EEOC Coim'L. MAN. (CCH) T 1225 (Oct. 1988)(stating that pursuant to sec-
tion 7(b) of the Age Discrimination Employment Act, the court may also assess, in
cases of willful violations, liquidated damages in an amount equal to the back
wages, plus interest; further, under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, an employee seeking relief under the Equal Pay Act may recover back wages
from three years in the case of willful violations before the date that suit is filed,
forward to the date of the court's decision, plus interest and potentially an equal
amount in liquidated damages).
167. See id. (discussing that willful violations will invoke punitive damages under the
Age in Discrimination Act and the Equal Pay Act); EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH)
2095 (Sept. 1992)(stating that malice or reckless indifference will invoke punitive
damages under Title VII).
168. See Brief for Petitioner at *29, McKennon (No. 93-1543)(discussing redress by an
employer and suggesting that even criminal or other forms of disciplinary pro-
ceedings might be appropriate).
1995]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
will try to show how this misrepresentation injured its business. If
the plaintiff, for example, was a salesperson who misrepresented that
he had a college degree on his application, then the employer may very
well have been injured by lower revenues due to the fact that the em-
ployee did not have the requisite training. For example, in Fried v.
AFTEC, Inc.,169 the court stated that although an employee is not
usually liable to an employer for lost profits, if the employee materi-
ally misrepresented his background, training, and skills to apply for a
job, the employer has an actionable claim.170 Although this will be
difficult for the employer to prove, it does not necessitate that the em-
ployer should have its outlay of damages reduced instead. Two rea-
sons support this proposition.
First, if there was truly a justifiable injury to the company through
the misrepresentation, the employer had two previous chances to cure
it: 1) the employer could have checked plaintiff's application thor-
oughly either at the initial hire or when it noticed plaintiff was not up
to the task; and 2) plaintiff could have terminated the employee when
it noticed the poor record. Second, just as it may be difficult for the
employer to prove it was injured through the misrepresentation, it
must also be remembered that it may be difficult for the employee to
prove that the employer was willful and deserved the imposition of
punitive damages. Additionally, if there was no recognized injury to
the employer, then it may be that the misrepresentation was not ma-
terial and the employer does not warrant the windfall of damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
Discrimination has been infecting a number of employment set-
tings. While the Summers reasoning only served to treat the symp-
toms of discrimination, the Court in McKennon has begun to treat the
underlying problem by stating that after-acquired evidence should not
be used at the liability stage. Not only is the after-acquired evidence
doctrine theoretically and practically distinct from mixed-motive
cases, it also plays no part in preventing a discrimination victim's in-
juries or fulfilling the interest of society and the goals of anti-discrimi-
nation statutes.
However, the Court's prescription to this end has not been made
strong enough. Neither Rule 11 sanctions nor attorney's fees will stop
employers from limiting their backpay liability, and as a result the
plaintiff will not be made whole in his backpay award. The time pe-
riod of when the employer would have by clear and convincing evi-
169. 587 A.2d 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
170. Id. at 298. Further, recognizing that an agent has a duty of loyalty to a principal,
the agent may be subject to liability for loss caused to the principal. REsTAT-
mENT (SEcoND) op AGENCY § 401 cmt. a (1958).
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dence discovered such after-acquired evidence under pre-set policies
rather than when it actually discovered such evidence should better
serve the make whole provisions of the anti-discrimination statutes.
While after-acquired evidence may limit an employee's equitable rem-
edies, however, the after-acquired evidence should never limit a plain-
tiff's compensatory or punitive damages. Harm has been done, and if
harm has been inflicted by each side, then each side should pursue its
own damages by presenting its case on the merits without the looming
foreclosure of the doctrine of after-acquired evidence.
What will be the effects of such a proposal? Both employers and
employees will face some changes and adapt to seek a balanced status
quo. First, employers will likely be more careful in how they operate,
and they should begin to enact policies and procedures to rid the work-
place of discrimination. The employer will know that a summary
judgment victory has, in essence, been foreclosed. It will know that to
deny a plaintiff backpay or reinstatement, a high burden will have to
be met. It will know that its economic resources will be tapped in
awards of compensatory and possibly punitive damages. It will know
that to survive, it will have to change. One side effect of such a change
will be that employers, to meet their burden in denying reinstatement
and limiting backpay, will enact tougher personnel policies to demon-
strate that they take misrepresentation and misconduct seriously. An
employer will check employee r6sum6s and applications more care-
fully before offering employment in an effort to discover misrepresen-
tations. It will periodically investigate the reports and conduct of
employees who are already on the job to show it "would have discov-
ered" any misconduct under its systematic procedures. The employer
will likely be more careful in who it selects and who it retains.
Second, employees will also be affected. Employees will likely
think twice before they lie on an application or commit on-the-job mis-
conduct. The employee will know that employers are enacting stricter
personnel policies in an effort to keep costs down. The employee will
know that to lie or steal will likely reduce the chance for backpay or
reinstatement. The employee will also know that while he may re-
ceive compensatory or even punitive damages, he will also be subject
to any claims by the employer. The employee will be more likely to be
careful of what he says and what he does both before he gets a job and
afterward.
In the short run, we may see a slight increase in monies spent in
defending these suits until the employer internalizes these costs by
focusing on prevention. The responsibility, however, should be on the
employer for it is the discrimination that begins these suits in the first
place. However, once this responsibility is recognized and under-
taken, both time and money spent in defending claims should be re-
duced; even summary judgment cases will be forgotten. In the long
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run, the goal is that a more efficient and productive workforce will
emerge-one where discrimination and harassment is reduced and
employee integrity and honesty is enhanced.
Carolyn L. Whitford '95
